A New European Parliament Won’t Solve the Continent’s Economic Problems

Many people were understandably relieved by the results of last weekend’s European elections, which saw the rise of the far right somewhat contained, at least for now. In Britain, France, Hungary, and Italy, nationalist parties that have embraced Euroskepticism did well. But, in Austria, Germany, and Spain, they won a smaller share of the vote than they did in the most recent national elections, and in Denmark and the Netherlands they suffered big setbacks. When the new Parliament gathers, an assortment of xenophobic right-wing parties will control about a quarter of the seats, making them a potent force but not a dominant one.

Among the winners of the election were two pro-European groups: the Greens, who took about nine per cent of the vote over all, and the centrist liberal-democrat bloc, which was strengthened by the presence of Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance alliance. An optimistic reading of the outcome is that, with the Greens on the rise and the centrists emboldened, the new Parliament will be able to provide the leadership that Europe so desperately needs after a decade of political crises and economic stagnation. On Tuesday, Macron, whose alliance gained 22.4 per cent of the French vote—one percentage point less than the far-right National Rally, which was formerly known as the National Front—outlined an agenda for European renewal, which includes addressing climate change, creating more jobs, and strengthening the E.U.’s economic institutions.

Sadly, though, there are reasons to be skeptical about whether the election, by itself, will make much of a difference. For one thing, the European Parliament still occupies a subservient position to the real power centers in the E.U.: the European Commission, an administrative body that proposes legislation and runs things day to day, and the European Council, which comprises the heads of state of all the member countries and also the Council’s president (Donald Tusk) and the president of the Commission (Jean-Claude Juncker). Decades ago, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the French President, commented dismissively that the Parliament “does not have any political power.” Things have changed a bit in recent years, but the scope for the Parliament to influence the over-all direction of the E.U. remains strictly circumscribed. And because the chamber is now even more fragmented than it was—the Web site Europe Elects lists twelve different groups that will be represented—it may have some difficulty exercising the powers it does have, which include helping to allocate the E.U.’s budget, conduct oversight, and make appointments.

As always in the E.U., any real change will have to be pushed through from the national capitals, particularly Paris and Berlin. But, with the union now comprising twenty-eight members, it is more difficult than ever to get agreement on significant reforms. Even the core eurozone, which has nineteen members, seems unable to do more than muddle through from crisis to crisis.

Although the number of asylum seekers has fallen sharply since 2016, no permanent solution to the migrant issue, which the parties of the far right are always eager to exploit, has been found. The eurozone’s economy has rebounded from the debt crisis of a decade ago, but the recovery has been modest and uneven. Since 2008, G.D.P. growth has averaged less than one per cent a year. To many Europeans, particularly in the southern countries, the E.U. still looks like an austerity trap. Its common currency and arbitrary fiscal rules rob individual countries of policy autonomy, and the lack of a fiscal union precludes the sort of large-scale federal transfers and guarantees that exist in the United States. As long as this economic structure prevails, Europe will be vulnerable to recessions, banking crises, and political upheaval.

The next showdown may well be in Italy, which has the third-largest economy in the E.U. On Tuesday, Matteo Salvini, the deputy prime minister and head of the far-right League—which took more than a third of the vote in the parliamentary election—called for a big tax cut to boost the somnolent Italian economy. Citing two of his inspirations, he said, “We need a Trump cure, an Orbán cure, a positive fiscal shock to restart the country.”

Strictly on economic grounds, Salvini has an argument to make. In inflation-adjusted terms, Italy’s G.D.P. is still about five per cent below its 2008 level, and the jobless rate remains above ten per cent. Clearly, there is spare capacity and inadequate demand. To be sure, the Italian economy has other problems, too, including scant productivity growth, an inadequate education system, and a high level of public debt, but these hardly justify asking the Italian population to endure another lost decade. Still, the E.U. authorities are refusing to back off. Even before Salvini’s statement, they were threatening to fine Italy billions of euros for having breached the eurozone’s fiscal rules already. Pointing to a rising ratio of government debt to G.D.P., an official at the European Commission told the Financial Times, “The numbers are clear-cut.”

The rise of the European far right can’t be reduced entirely to conservative economics. In some countries, such as Poland and Germany, extremist parties have risen in popularity despite decent rates of G.D.P. growth. Migration, racism, demagoguery, and the development of social media have all played significant roles. But the ultimate promise of the European project was peace and liberty buttressed by rising economic prosperity, and, during the past decade, this last leg has buckled.

Two years ago, when Macron was elected President of France, there were hopes that he could forge a grand bargain with Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, which would address some of the eurozone’s shortcomings, such as the lack of a common fiscal policy. Many German officials weren’t keen on this idea to begin with, however. As electoral setbacks for Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union weakened her position and eventually prompted her to step down as party leader, hopes of any big changes have receded.

On Tuesday, Merkel, in an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, acknowledged the rise of “dark forces”—nationalism, populism, and anti-Semitism—in Germany and other European countries. “We must face up to the spectres of the past,” Merkel said. “We have to tell our young people what history has brought over us and others.” But the Chancellor, who has also said that she won’t stand for office again in 2021, didn’t articulate any great vision or policy agenda to reinvigorate the E.U.

That task may be left to those who, last weekend, rejected the slogans of the right and embraced European ideals, such as Greens in Germany and Ireland, social democrats in Spain and Sweden, liberal democrats in France and Denmark, and backers of a People’s Vote in Britain. Despite all of the E.U.’s problems, there is still a strong reservoir of support for the values it embodies, and prophets of its doom have repeatedly been proved wrong. Europe has great strengths. It also needs to work better.